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TAKING COMMERCIAL LAW SERIOUSLY:
FROM JURISPRUDENCE TO PEDAGOGY
DENNIS PATTERSON*
I. CODE JURISPRUDENCE
The Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code") is the singular
expression of a jurisprudential vision. As the conventional wisdom
suggests, American Legal Realism was both a reaction to Legal
Formalism' as well as a striking vision of the role of law in modern
society. The Code was, of course, fashioned in the image of one of its
principal architects, Karl N. Llewellyn. No jurisprudence of the Code
is possible without some account of Llewellyn's jurisprudence and the
"realism" he fostered in his great legislative achievement.2
Formalism, at least Langdellian formalism, was a vision of law in
the manner of early modernist science. Like the natural scientists he
so admired, Langdell wanted to uncover the logic of law, a logic that
he believed was hidden beneath the play of judicial decision-making.
As he famously said,
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein
of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to
acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest
student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in
many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the
main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if
not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying
the cases in which it is embodied. But the cases which are useful
and necessary for this purpose at the present day bear an
exceedingly small proportion to all those that have been reported.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law (Camden). I wish
to thank the faculty of the University of San Diego School of Law for the opportunity to present
a draft of this article.
1. I discuss formalism in Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196
(1995).
2. For a discussion of Llewellyn's jurisprudence and the special context of Merchant
Rules in the Code, see Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
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The vast majority are useless and worse than useless for any
purpose of systematic study. Moreover, the number of fundamental
legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed; the many
different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its
appearance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a
repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension.
If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each
should be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would
cease to be formidable from their number.3
To be sure, Llewellyn's realism was a rejection of Langdellian
formalism. But it is important to appreciate that, like Langdell,
Llewellyn did not reject the idea that law could be found. Rather,
Llewellyn thought that the law Langdell found hidden was already in
plain view.4
Unlike Langdell, who believed that the state of the law could be
divined from underlying principles, Llewellyn rejected the idea that
rules or principles were the best source for divining the law of a
transaction. For this, one must turn to commercial practices.
There is no better confirmation of this characterization than the
text of the Code itself. Consider the definition of Agreement:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as
provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an
agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions
of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (Section
1-103). 5
When asking whether the parties have an Agreement, and what
the content of that Agreement might be, one looks not to legal norms
but to what the Code refers to (without definition) as "the bargain of
the parties in fact." The task of a judge is not to look at the facts and
couple those with norms to reach a legal conclusion. Rather, the
judge is to look at the facts as they would be viewed by a similarly-
situated merchant and, on that basis, draw a conclusion.
This Realist vision of law is profoundly different from formalism
and, yet, strangely similar. The Realist-in this case, Llewellyn-is
3. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi-vii (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 1871).
4. Llewellyn's view is criticized in Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 624 (1975) (noting that, for Llewellyn,
"an 'immanent law' lay embedded in any situation and the task of the law authority was to
discover it").
5. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1989).
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not denying that "law" has a source, 6 rather, he is just locating the
source in a different place.
II. THE CODE AS A SOURCE OF LAW
Defined in terms of sources, commercial law is composed almost
exclusively by the Uniform Commercial Code and the common law of
contracts. 7 Among statutes, the Code is unique for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it is the earliest, if not
the purest, expression of a jurisprudence. 8 Owing both to the passage
of time, and current redrafting efforts, the jurisprudential dimension
of the Code has narrowed in both its scope and importance. These
developments do not in any way diminish the centrality of the Code
for questions of commercial law: the Code is the principal text for
resolving questions of commercial law.
As a statute, and as a jurisprudential artifact, the Code has been
the subject of extensive commentary and analysis. Like other areas of
private law, the Code has been a favorite object of scrutiny from a
diverse range of perspectives, from economics to critical theory.
Whatever the merits of these analyses may be, scant attention has
been paid to the question how best to teach the subject.9
Having written about and taught the Code for a decade, I
welcome the opportunity to express my opinion on what it means to
take commercial law seriously. I propose to make my comments in a
very specific context, that of pedagogy.
I have just completed a casebook in commercial law. 10 This multi-
year project was an occasion for me to think through what
commercial law is all about and, more importantly, how to teach the
subject. I have learned much in the process of this unique and quite
demanding project. To share what I have learned, I want to describe
what Richard Hyland and I are trying to do with this book and why
we think taking commercial law seriously requires rethinking what it
means to teach the subject.
6. Thus, we may conclude that both Formalism and Realism are, in some sense,
positivistic.
7. For the most recent general statement of the rules of contract law, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
8. For discussion of the jurisprudential dimensions of the Code, see Danzig, supra note 4.
9. But there have been some interesting commentaries. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A
Case Study in Pedagogical Neglect, 92 YALE L.J. 188 (1982) (reviewing RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET
AL., TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (3d ed. 1981)).
10. RICHARD HYLAND & DENNIS PATTERSON, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL LAW
(1999).
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III. COMMERCIAL LAW TODAY
One avenue to understanding any subject is to look at how
knowledge of the subject is transferred from one generation to the
next. Considering the law school curriculum, one sees a variety of
approaches, even within a given field. These differences in
perspective or orientation are manifested in the variety of approaches
to a given subject-matter. This reflects both a healthy diversity of
pedagogical opinion as well as different approaches to theorizing a
field.
When one looks at the commercial law curriculum, it is
astonishing to see that, unlike any other subject in the law school
curriculum, commercial law is taught along two parallel but non-
communicating tracks. First, there is the survey course devoted to a
basic overview of the subject matter. Typically taught for four credits,
this course proceeds in turn through each of the Articles-the major
subject-matter divisions-of the Code. The course is designed
principally for students who wish some familiarity with the Code
(especially in those jurisdictions in which commercial law is tested on
the bar exam) but who have decided that they do not wish to pursue a
career in the commercial field.
These courses, and the casebooks designed for them, are meant
to be neither sophisticated nor demanding. Time limitations prevent
in-depth examination of the complicated interrelationships among
Code provisions. Cases are chosen with one criterion in mind: they
stand squarely for principles or rules contained in the Code. Like the
cases, problems in these texts tend to be relatively easy to resolve.
Set against this introductory track is a second, parallel track. This
track consists of a series of advanced courses, taught for two, three, or
four credits, generally in three areas-sales, negotiable instruments
and bank collections, and secured transactions. The books in these
fields are deeply probing and demanding. Those who teach from
these books are rarely able to teach all of the material they contain in
the time allotted. These courses are often taken by students who wish
to practice in the field of private transactions and who are therefore
motivated to examine in depth the issues presented by the material.
Commercial law teaching is at a crossroads because the
relationship between these two tracks is entirely unresolved. A
number of solutions are currently possible, though unattractive. In
some schools, students take either the basic course or one or more of
the advanced courses, but not both. The disadvantages of this solution
[Vol. 74:625
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are several. First, students are asked to decide at an early date in their
legal education whether they wish to be commercial specialists or
outsiders in the field. Second, there is no introductory course on the
advanced track. In those schools in which the advanced courses may
be taken without prerequisite, the courses are taught with at least one
eye to the beginner, and the courses are unable to fulfill their promise
of producing lawyers with a deep knowledge of the field. That is one
of the reasons it is so difficult to teach all the way through the
advanced casebooks. If, however, the courses are designated in
sequence, commercial paper almost always comes at the end, and
students will typically have to take ten credits of commercial law in
order to learn about the law relating to their checking accounts.
This parallel structure is unsatisfactory and in need of
replacement. In our casebook, we propose a uniform introductory
course to commercial law. The course would be taken both by those
who wish to become criminal prosecutors and those who plan to
practice commercial law. The introductory course we envision would
be a rigorous introduction to the conceptual problems raised by the
practice of commercial transactions, both for the deal-maker and the
litigator. It would examine all of the basic substantive areas of the
Code, but not with the goal of providing an overview or preparing
students for the bar exam. Instead, it would explore problems and
cases in some depth and would attempt to communicate the
fascination that commercial problems can elicit."1
IV. METHODOLOGY
As is true in every intellectual and professional field,
methodology is central. The methodology of the law school casebook
has undergone some evolution since Langdell, but its basic form and
structure are significant elements in the American legal tradition. Our
casebook will be familiar and congenial to those who appreciate the
traditional law school casebook. It contains cases, problems, and brief
texts that provide orientation to the issues, large and small, that are
covered by the material. The innovations we employ occur principally
in five areas.
11. One of our theoretical contentions is that it is a pedagogical mistake to believe that
imparting rules is the most important task of commercial law teaching. Rather, we believe that
thorough understanding of the Institutions of the Code is the most important goal in
commercial law teaching.
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A. Emphasizing Independence of Thought
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the overview casebooks, as they
currently exist, is that they rely on the cases for only one purpose, and
that is to state the rules in the field. This use of the cases actually
hinders students in their effort to develop their independent
reasoning ability.
We use cases in two quite different ways. To begin with, the
commercial cases often present an invaluable statement of the context
of the legal questions posed by the dispute. Today, students tend to
rush through that statement in order to get to the holding, the rule
that will be the subject of class discussion. We, instead, take
advantage of the facts to give students a feel for what life is like in the
world of commerce. We try to explain whether the particular
situation examined is typical or atypical. We also explain the
relatively complicated relationships in such a way that they serve as a
framework for a practical understanding of the issues involved. We
ask whether either the parties or their lawyers might have done
anything to avoid the problem that produced the legal dispute.
After aiding students to focus on the facts of the case, we
encourage them to attempt to construct a legal solution-without first
reading the legal analysis provided by the court. We ask them where
they believe it would be appropriate to begin. Step by step they
resolve the issues outstanding, moving from one Code provision to
the next, and often to extra-Code material. In order to achieve this
result, we innovate somewhat in terms of the presentation of the
material and casebook design. More about this below.
After the students have reasoned their own way to a resolution,
we turn to the court's opinion. We ask students to examine the
opinion from the point of view of the answer they have already
constructed. They easily recognize any errors, gaps, or inconsistencies
in the court's reasoning. They are able to appreciate any
exceptionally creative constructions which the judge has produced.
Finally, with two or more possible solutions, we are able to ask the
students to determine why the court reached the result that it did. We
thus preserve both the possibility of critique and a respect for the
wisdom of the common law judge.
B. Understanding of Interconnectedness
One of the unique features of commercial transactions is that
[Vol. 74:625
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they frequently involve more than two parties and more than one
area of the law. A typical sale and lease-back of a commercial
airplane, for example, involves numerous parties and financing
entities, as well as the law of sales, leases, secured transactions,
negotiable instruments, and often letters of credit as well. Yet these
areas are almost always, in the overview casebooks, treated
separately. The interrelationship is rarely examined.
We teach commercial law on the basis of fact situations that
permit us to explore these relationships. In other words, instead of
attempting to teach through the Code from one Article to the next,
we take advantage of the fact that the course is not limited in its
commercial scope to a certain area. We examine all of the issues that
arise in the particular commercial context. This contextual
preparation gives students the foundation they require to appreciate
the issues raised in the more specialized courses.
Another type of interrelationship is examined as well. In order to
resolve many commercial issues, the Code often provides the reader
with a round-trip ticket through its different Articles. These cross-
references are usually ignored, because they point away from the
issue that is the subject of immediate discussion. We instead
emphasize these cross-references as a way of examining how the
various Code provisions work together.
We also suggest to students that they consider the Code
provisions from a more theoretically rigorous point of view. We ask
them to compare the provisions that appear in a related form in
different Articles. A good example is the notion of warranties, that
appears in the Articles dealing with sales, leases, negotiable
instruments, bank collections, letters of credit, documents of title, and
investment securities. We want to know what these provisions have in
common and how they differ. In the end, students know much more
about warranty law than would be possible by an exclusive focus on
the provisions of any one Article.
C. Relating to the Common Law
Commercial law teachers frequently remark that students seem
to have insufficient preparation for the study of commercial law. The
observation is accurate. There are several reasons for the problem.
First, students have immediately behind them an intense experience
in the common law courses, but much of that knowledge is not yet
part of their active vocabularies. Second, many of the most important
1999]
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common law questions are not discussed in the first year of law school
or, for that matter, anywhere else in depth-particularly questions of
restitution, equity, and agency.
Our holistic approach to commercial transactions is able to
remedy this problem. When common law issues arise-such as
assignments in the field of secured transactions, the parol evidence
rule in the law of sales warranties, restitution in negotiable
instruments law, property law concepts in the law of good faith
purchase -we examine those issues with just as much care as we treat
topics that are regulated in the Code. This provides students with an
opportunity to solidify their knowledge of the common law subjects
and, at the same time, to see them in their context. We especially
discuss the differing remedial consequences of actions sounding in the
various fields.
D. Creating a More Flexible Casebook Design
Traditionally, casebooks have presented alternating blocks of
text, generally in the same typeface-cases, editorial commentary,
problems. Our approach requires interruption of the flow of the court
opinion, for example, in order to ask a question or make a comment.
We also separate the statement of facts from the court's reasoning
and conclusions.
One of the primary motivations for our approach is the belief
that students cannot learn commercial law without constructing their
own solutions to legal problems. To achieve this goal, we eschew the
usual approach to commentary and question, that is, reserving these
for presentation after the student has read the opinion. By
intervening in the opinion with the student, we are confident we can
bolster the ability to master the facts of a case and bring to bear a
variety of possible legal solutions. In this way, we believe our
approach is closer to the actual practice of commercial law than the
traditional approach.
V. OUR GOAL FOR THE CASEBOOK
To sum up, this casebook turns the introductory course in
commercial law into a significant contribution to a student's general
legal education. Students will learn to work in a field in which case-
oriented thinking and statutory interpretation are organically related.
Students learn the basic vocabulary of commercial law. They will
[Vol. 74:625
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discover how to disentangle and resolve the various elements in
complex commercial transactions. They see how the Code fits into the
framework of the common law. Our casebook is, and will appear to
be, innovative, yet it will be comfortable to teach and to study. It
contributes to a much-needed restructuring of the commercial law
curriculum throughout the country and provide a model for rigorous,
analytical, practice-oriented casebooks for the next decade.
CONCLUSION
I began by discussing the importance of the concept of
Agreement in the overall structure of the Code. As I have said
elsewhere,12 this concept is central to a global understanding both of
the Code and Llewellyn's aspirations for this quintessentially Realist
legislative artifact. Notwithstanding the importance of Llewellyn's
unique jurisprudential vision, more-much more-is required if one
is to have a thorough grounding in the intricacies of the Code. In
short, it is no easy task to move from the realm of jurisprudential
vision to the concrete reality of the practicing commercial lawyer.
Richard Hyland and I believe our casebook is true both to
Llewellyn's unique vision of law and the needs of law students and
their instructors in the late twentieth century.
12. See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration:
Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169 (1989);
Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335 (1988).
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APPENDIX
The following case comes from a chapter on Formalities.1 3 This
chapter explores the Code's most important formal requirements,
exhibited in contexts as varied as the Statute of Frauds in Article Two
and the three necessary elements of a Security Agreement under
section 9-203. In the opinion, our interventions are set off in italics.
This case is representative of the book as a whole.
DF ACTIVITIES CORPORATION v. BROWN
851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988)
Before POSNER, COFFEY, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal in a diversity breach of contract case raises an
interesting question concerning the statute of frauds, in the context of
a dispute over a chair of more than ordinary value. The plaintiff, DF
Activities Corporation (owner of the Domino's pizza chain), is
controlled by a passionate enthusiast for the work of Frank Lloyd
Wright. The defendant, Dorothy Brown, a resident of Lake Forest (a
suburb of Chicago) lived for many years in a house designed by Frank
Lloyd Wright-the Willits House-and became the owner of a chair
that Wright had designed, the Willits Chair. This is a stark, high-
backed, uncomfortable-looking chair of distinguished design that DF
wanted to add to its art collection. In September and October 1986,
Sarah-Ann Briggs, DF's art director, negotiated with Dorothy Brown
to buy the Willits Chair. DF contends-and Mrs. Brown denies-that
she agreed in a phone conversation with Briggs on November 26 to
sell the chair to DF for $60,000, payable in two equal installments, the
first due on December 31 and the second on March 26. On December
3 Briggs wrote Brown a letter confirming the agreement, followed
shortly by a check for $30,000. Two weeks later Brown returned the
letter and the check with the following handwritten note at the
bottom of the letter: "Since I did not hear from you until December
13. HYLAND & PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 148. The court's footnotes have been
omitted from the case report.
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and I spoke with you the middle of November, I have made other
arrangements for the chair. It is no longer available for sale to you."
Sometime later Brown sold the chair for $198,000, precipitating this
suit for the difference between the price at which the chair was sold
and the contract price of $60,000.
There is already so much to talk about in this amazing case.
First things first. Each time you encounter a case decided under the
Code, find the precise remedies provision that governs the action. The method
of starting with the remedies provisions will save you an infinite amount of
effort-and grief- later on. In general, if there is no provision in the Code that
provides the remedy your client is seeking, the Code is irrelevant to your case.
Moreover, the remedies provisions help you structure your investigation of the
issues, since these provisions inform you of exactly what must be proved in
order to succeed. By beginning with the remedies provisions, you will assure
yourself that you discuss all the issues and can also be certain that nothing
irrelevant creeps into your analysis.
Note that Posner does not find it necessary actually to refer to the
relevant Code section. (That however does not provide an excuse for you!)
The sales remedies are divided into remedies available to the seller, catalogued
in § 2-703, and those available to the buyer, partially catalogued in § 2-711.
The buyer wishes damages for the seller's failure to deliver the chair. We are in
§2-713. Note that the measure of damages for failure to deliver- the
expectation damages-is the difference between the contract price ($60,000)
and the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach, which may
well be the $198,000 that another buyer agreed to pay in an arm's length
transaction. Since the third party seems to be a good faith purchaser for value,
title has probably passed to the third party and specific performance is
therefore unavailable- even though we are speaking of antique furniture.
Which brings us to the fairness issues here. The owner of Domino's
Pizza is seeking to enforce a contract to purchase a chair worth $198,000 for
the price of $60,000. If we assume for a moment that such a contract was
actually entered into by both parties, curiosity requires us to ask how that
might have happened. Did Sarah Ann Briggs of DF call Ms. Brown out of the
blue and offer $60,000 for the chair? Did she keep calling until Ms. Brown
gave in? And did it then finally occur to Ms. Brown that she may be able to
find someone who could appraise the chair for her?
If the sales price to DF is in fact less than one-third of the chair's market
value, should the courts enforce this sale, even if there is a way to overcome
the Statute of Frauds difficulties? What doctrine would you use on her
behalf-mistake, unconscionability? Is there possibly some element of these
[Vol. 74:625
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fairness considerations in the court's interpretation of the Statute of Frauds? If
the facts were different, can you see the court producing a different ruling on
the particular question at issue in this case?
Brown moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the suit as
barred by the statute of frauds in the Uniform Commercial Code. See
UCC § 2-201. (The Code is, of course, in force in Illinois, and the
substantive issues in this case are, all agree, governed by Illinois law.)
Attached to the motion was Brown's affidavit that she had never
agreed to sell the chair to DF or its representative, Briggs. The
affidavit also denied any recollection of a conversation with Briggs on
November 26, and was accompanied by both a letter from Brown to
Briggs dated September 20 withdrawing an offer to sell the chair and
a letter from Briggs to Brown dated October 29 withdrawing DF's
offer to buy the chair.
The district judge granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
the suit. DF appeals, contending that although a contract for a sale of
goods at a price of $500 or more is subject to the statute of frauds, the
(alleged) oral contract made on November 26 may be within the
statutory exception for cases where "the party against whom
enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made." UCC § 2-201(3)(b). DF
does not argue that Brown's handwritten note at the bottom of
Briggs' letter is sufficient acknowledgment of a contract to bring the
case within the exemption in section 2-201(1).
At first glance DF's case may seem quite hopeless. Far from
admitting in her pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made, Mrs. Brown denied under oath that a
contract had been made. DF argues, however, that if it could depose
her, maybe she would admit in her deposition that the affidavit was in
error, that she had talked to Briggs on November 26, and that they
had agreed to the sale of the chair on the terms contained in Briggs'
letter of confirmation to her.
If Briggs had offered a fair price for the chair, DF's owner would now be
sitting on it rather than on an equally uncomfortable bench in Judge Posner's
courtroom. Is there not a lesson here about greed, especially in the settling of
cases?
There is remarkably little authority on the precise question
1999]
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raised by this appeal-whether a sworn denial ends the case or the
plaintiff may press on, and insist on discovery. In fact we have found
no authority at the appellate level, state or federal. Many cases hold,
it is true, that the defendant in a suit on an oral contract apparently
made unenforceable by the statute of frauds cannot block discovery
aimed at extracting an admission that the contract was made, simply
by moving to dismiss the suit on the basis of the statute of frauds or
by denying in the answer to the complaint that a contract had been
made. See, e.g., M & W Farm Service v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d 271,
275-76 (Iowa 1979). There is also contrary authority, illustrated by
Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co., 63 N.Y.2d 616, 618, 479 N.Y.S.2d 499,
500, 468 N.E.2d 681, 682 (1984). The clash of views is well discussed in
Triangle Marketing, Inc. v. Action Industries, Inc., 630 F.Supp. 1578,
1581-83 (N.D.Il.1986), which, in default of any guidance from Illinois
courts, adopted the Boylan position. We need not take sides on the
conflict.
The fact that this is obviously such a difficult question reveals a lot about
the conflicting currents in which the Statute of Frauds is to be interpreted.
Upon a first glance at the relevant Code section (§ 2-201(3) (b)), it seems that
the Statute is only overcome if the party who asserts the defense of a lack of a
writing has already admitted the existence of the contract on the writing. If the
purpose of the Statute is to protect a party who has not yet signed a writing- in
circumstances in which it is reasonable to expect that a writing would be
signed if there were really a contract- then there is no reason to subject a party
who has not signed to a deposition (and the temptation to lie). For, even if the
parties had reached an oral agreement, that should not make the contract
enforceable absent the protection of the writing. If, on the other hand, we only
protect parties who in fact never entered into an oral agreement, then we do
not have a formality at all, but rather a swearing contest. Once again, the
question is whether the dominant purpose of the statute is to protect one
party's right to reflect or if it is to prevent a fraudulent assertion of the
existence of an oral agreement.
When there is a bare motion to dismiss, or an answer, with no
evidentiary materials, the possibility remains a live one that, if asked
under oath whether a contract had been made, the defendant would
admit it had been. The only way to test the proposition is for the
plaintiff to take the defendant's deposition, or, if there is no
discovery, to call the defendant as an adverse witness at trial. But
where as in this case the defendant swears in an affidavit that there
[Vol. 74:625
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was no contract, we see no point in keeping the lawsuit alive. Of
course the defendant may blurt out an admission in a deposition, but
this is hardly likely, especially since by doing so he may be admitting
to having perjured himself in his affidavit. Stranger things have
happened, but remote possibilities do not warrant subjecting the
parties and the judiciary to proceedings almost certain to be futile.
A plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment by arguing that
although in pretrial discovery he has gathered no evidence of the
defendant's liability, his luck may improve at trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,
496 (7th Cir.1986); Spellman v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 148, 151 (7th
Cir.1988). The statement in a leading commercial law text that a
defense based on the statute of fraud must always be determined at
trial because the defendant might in cross-examination admit the
making of the contract, see White & Summers, Handbook of the Law
Under the Uniform Commercial Code 67 (1980), reflects a
misunderstanding of the role of summary judgment; for the statement
implies, contrary to modern practice, that a party unable to generate
a genuine issue of fact at the summary judgment stage, because he has
no evidence with which to contest an affidavit of his adversary, see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), may nevertheless obtain a trial of the issue. He
may not. By the same token, a plaintiff in a suit on a contract within
the statute of frauds should not be allowed to resist a motion to
dismiss, backed by an affidavit that the defendant denies the contract
was made, by arguing that his luck may improve in discovery. Just as
summary judgment proceedings differ from trials, so the conditions of
a deposition differ from the conditions in which an affidavit is
prepared; affidavits in litigation are prepared by lawyers, and merely
signed by affiants. Yet to allow an affiant to be deposed by opposing
counsel would be to invite the unedifying form of discovery in which
the examining lawyer tries to put words in the witness's mouth and
construe them as admissions.
The history of the judicial-admission exception to the statute of
frauds, well told in Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37
Cornell L.Q. 355 (1952), reinforces our conclusion. The exception
began with common-sense recognition that if the defendant admitted
in a pleading that he had made a contract with the plaintiff, the
purpose of the statute of frauds-protection against fraudulent or
otherwise false contractual claims-was fulfilled. (The situation
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would be quite otherwise, of course, with an oral admission, for a
plaintiff willing to testify falsely to the existence of a contract would
be equally willing to testify falsely to the defendant's having admitted
the existence of the contract.) Toward the end of the eighteenth
century the courts began to reject the exception, fearing that it was an
invitation to the defendant to perjure himself. Later the pendulum
swung again, and the exception is now firmly established. The
concern with perjury that caused the courts in the middle period to
reject the exception supports the position taken by Mrs. Brown in this
case. She has sworn under oath that she did not agree to sell the
Willits Chair to DF. DF wants an opportunity to depose her in the
hope that she can be induced to change her testimony. But if she
changes her testimony this will be virtually an admission that she
perjured herself in her affidavit (for it is hardly likely that her denial
was based simply on a faulty recollection). She is not likely to do this.
What is possible is that her testimony will be sufficiently ambiguous
to enable DF to argue that there should be still further factual
investigation -perhaps a full-fledged trial at which Mrs. Brown will
be questioned again about the existence of the contract.
With such possibilities for protraction, the statute of frauds
becomes a defense of meager value. And yet it seems to us as it did to
the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code that the statute of
frauds serves an important purpose in a system such as ours that does
not require that all contracts be in writing in order to be enforceable
and that allows juries of lay persons to decide commercial cases. The
methods of judicial factfinding do not distinguish unerringly between
true and false testimony, and are in any event very expensive. People
deserve some protection against the risks and costs of being hauled
into court and accused of owing money on the basis of an
unacknowledged promise. And being deposed is scarcely less
unpleasant than being cross-examined-indeed, often it is more
unpleasant, because the examining lawyer is not inhibited by the
presence of a judge or jury who might resent hectoring tactics. The
transcripts of depositions are often very ugly documents.
Some courts still allow the judicial-admission exception to be
defeated by the defendant's simple denial, in a pleading, that there
was a contract; this is the position well articulated in Judge Shadur's
opinion in the Triangle Marketing case. To make the defendant
repeat the denial under oath is already to erode the exception (as well
as to create the invitation to perjury that so concerned the courts that
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rejected the judicial-admission exception altogether), for there is
always the possibility, though a very small one, that the defendant
might be charged with perjury. But, in any event, once the defendant
has denied the contract under oath, the safety valve of section
2-201(3)(b) is closed. The chance that at a deposition the defendant
might be badgered into withdrawing his denial is too remote to justify
prolonging an effort to enforce an oral contract in the teeth of the
statute of frauds. If Dorothy Brown did agree on November 27 to sell
the chair to DF at a bargain price, it behooved Briggs to get Brown's
signature on the dotted line, posthaste.
AFFIRMED.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority's holding that additional
discovery is prohibited whenever a defendant raises a statute of
frauds defense and submits a sworn denial that he or she formed an
oral contract with the plaintiff, I respectfully dissent. Neither would I
hold, however, that a plaintiff is automatically entitled to additional
discovery in the face of a defendant's sworn denial that an agreement
was reached. Rather, in my view district courts should have the
authority to exercise their discretion to determine the limits of
permissible discovery in these cases. This flexibility is particularly
important where, as here, the defendant's affidavit does not contain a
conclusive denial of contract formation. While district courts have
broad discretion in discovery matters, I believe the district court
abused that discretion in the present case.
I.
The purpose of the statute of frauds "is to protect a party from
the fraudulent and perjurious claim of another that an oral contract
was made and not to prevent an oral contract admittedly made from
enforcement." URSA Farmers Coop. Co. v. Trent, 58 Ill.App.3d 930,
16 Il.Dec. 348, 350, 374 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (1978) (citing Cohn v.
Fisher, 118 N.J.Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222 (1972)).
Note how the ascription of a purpose to a statute determines its scope and
application. Judge Flaum asserts that the purpose of the Statute is solely to
prevent fraudulent claims of contract. If such is the purpose of the Statute, then
of course oral agreements that conclusively can be shown to exist should be
enforced. If, however, the Statute has the additional purpose of requiring a
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writing in those transactional situations in which reasonable parties would not
feel comfortable saying there is a deal until the writing is executed, then even a
proven oral agreement should not be enforceable.
The purpose determines the construction of the statute. From this
understanding there is only one step to Llewellyn's insight that a good
argument can be made on each side of every case, for it is relatively easy to
formulate the purpose of a statute in both narrow and more broad-ranging
terms. Remember this as you prepare for your exam -and as you write legal
arguments for the rest of your career. A corollary is that a Code provision
never interprets itself. Before a provision can be applied, it must be
constructed, and before it can be constructed, its purpose must be
determined-or more precisely, one ascribed to it.
The statute is also designed to protect innocent parties from the
expense of defending against allegations that they breached a
contract that is not evidenced by a writing.
Yet Judge Flaum seems to draw no consequences from this second
purpose of the rule. Why?
As the majority notes, there is no Illinois case law conclusively
deciding a plaintiff's right to obtain further discovery when a
defendant denies the existence of an oral contract in a sworn affidavit.
Relevant case law in other jurisdictions is split between the position
that the majority adopts today and a rule permitting additional
discovery (and in some cases full trials) in statute of frauds cases....
A.
Although it is difficult to give full effect to both the statute of
frauds and the admissions exception thereto, that is what we must
attempt to do. In my view, these provisions can best be reconciled by
allowing district courts to exercise their discretion to determine when
additional discovery is likely to be fruitful and when it is being sought
just to improperly pursue a defendant who is clearly entitled to the
protection of the statute of frauds.
If a denial is a complete bar to additional discovery, the
exception to the statute of frauds for admissions made in a "pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made"
would be rendered virtually meaningless. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 26, para.
2-201(3)(b) (emphasis added). In Illinois involuntary admissions can
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satisfy the admissions exception to the statute of frauds. See URSA
Farmers, 58 Ill.App.3d 930, 16 Ill.Dec. 348, 374 N.E.2d 1123. Such
involuntary admissions will be almost impossible under the majority's
rule because the plaintiff will never have an opportunity to examine
the defendant in order to elicit an involuntary admission. Either the
defendant will make a fatal admission in his or her affidavit and the
statute of frauds exception will be satisfied without resort to the
testimony component, or the defendant will deny the contract in his
or her pleadings and the case will be dismissed before a testimonial
admission is possible. A blanket rule prohibiting any further
discovery once the defendant denies under oath that a contract was
formed is therefore too inflexible.
In general this is a good interpretive strategy-every provision of the
Code should have some field of operation. If the suggested interpretation of
one provision essentially writes another provision out of the book, then that
interpretation is probably incorrect. However, the goal is not to provide the
maximum domain for every rule. Some rules are designed to govern few cases.
There would be nothing wrong with an interpretation of this Code section that
permitted only voluntary admissions to defeat the Statute of Frauds.
Similarly, I would not adopt a rule that requires district courts to
allow additional discovery in every one of these cases. I would leave
the decision to the discretion of the district judge. In cases where a
defendant does not explicitly deny under oath that an oral contract
was reached, or where there is some indication that the statute of
frauds is being used to perpetrate a fraud, it would be permissible to
allow the plaintiff to question the defendant under oath to ensure that
he or she personally denies that the parties formed an oral contract.
This does not mean, however, that summary judgment is never
appropriate when the statute of frauds is raised as an affirmative
defense. If a defendant who conditionally denies contract formation
in his or her pleadings or affidavit specifically denies that an
agreement was reached in a deposition, summary judgment might
well be appropriate at that stage of the litigation. A simple denial in
an affidavit, however, should not trigger foreclosure of further
discovery in every case.
B.
In the present case I think the district court abused its discretion
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by disallowing any additional discovery once Brown filed her motion
to dismiss and accompanying affidavit. The majority argues that it
would be futile for DF Activities Corporation ("DF") to take
Brown's deposition. Brown is unlikely to admit any facts from which
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that an oral contract was
formed because, in the face of her affidavit, such admissions would
leave her exposed to perjury charges. In my view, this overstates the
content of Brown's affidavit. While Brown denied that any oral or
written agreement was reached in both her answer and motion to
dismiss, such a blanket denial is curiously missing from her affidavit.
Rather, in her affidavit Brown stated only that she did not accept any
offer from Domino's Farms or Sarah Briggs for the sale of the Willits
chair and that she does not recall having a conversation with Sarah
Briggs on November 26, 1988. Deposing Brown therefore would not
necessarily be a futile effort. It is possible that under questioning
during a deposition Brown would remember the November 26
conversation during which Briggs claims she and Brown reached an
agreement for the sale of the chair. Although any convenient prior
memory lapse might be viewed with suspicion if a deposition elicited
additional information, it is highly unlikely that it would lead to
perjury charges. On the facts of this case, I believe the district court
abused its discretion when it refused to allow DF to take Brown's
deposition.
II.
I share the majority's concern that one of the purposes of the
statute of frauds is to protect litigants from the cost of defending
breach of contract claims based on alleged agreements that are not
supported by written documentation. The statute of frauds, however,
contains a specific exception for cases in which a party admits in a
pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court that an oral contract was
reached, and that provision must be given some effect. The
testimonial admissions provision would be virtually meaningless if a
district court could never exercise its discretion to permit additional
discovery in the face of a defendant's sworn denial in an affidavit.
Because in my view the district court abused its discretion when
it prohibited further discovery, I would remand this case to the
district court with instructions to permit discovery to continue at least
to the point where DF is given an opportunity to depose Brown. If
Brown then denies under oath during her deposition that any oral
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contract was made, summary judgment might well be appropriate at
that time.

